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RECENT DECISIONS 
Ar.mNs-DENATURALIZATION-REQUIREMENT THAT THE GoVERNMENT BE 
DECEIVED IN NATURALIZATION PROCEEDING AS BASIS FOR DENATURALIZATION-
Defendant Umberto Anastasio, arrived in this country as a deserting seaman 
in 1917. A certificate of registry was granted in 1931 upon the fraudulent 
allegation in his application and testimony before an immigration inspector 
that he had never been arrested.1 After filing other papers necessary for natu-
ralization, defendant was issued a certificate of arrival in 1933 based on the 
certificate of registry. Before obtaining citizenship, however, defendant 
executed an affidavit which revealed his criminal record and filed a con-
sent of dismissal of his petition for naturalization in 1935. In 1942, while 
in the United States Army, defendant applied for naturalization and fully 
revealed his previous criminal record. A new certificate of arrival was 
issued in 1943 based upon the 1931 certificate of registry. In 1943, the 
Common Pleas Court of Lebanon County, Pennsylvania, admitted the 
defendant to citizenship upon the recommendation2 of an Immigration 
and Naturalization Service examiner who had interviewed the defendant, 
was aware of his previous criminal record, had a file containing the 1931-
1935 naturalization proceeding, but lacked the registry file. In a de-
naturalization proceeding in 1952, defendant's certificate of naturalization 
was cancelled and the order admitting him to citizenship revoked on the 
ground that the certificate of arrival granted in 1943 was based upon the 
void certificate of registry issued in 1931 and that the use of the latter 
certificate in the 1943 naturalization proceeding was fraud on the court.8 
On appeal, held, reversed, one judge dissenting. Although the defendant 
had concealed his criminal record in a prior naturalization proceeding, his 
disclosure in the 1942 proceeding estopped the government from claiming 
that citizenship has been granted because of the practice of fraud or il-
legality. United States v. Anastasio, (3d Cir. 1955) 226 F. (2d) 912, cert. 
den. (U.S. 1956) 76 S.Ct. 787. 
1 The record indicated that defendant had been arrested five times prior to the 
filing of the Application for Registry. Principal case at 913-914. 
2 The examiner based his recommendation upon the defendant's commanding officer's 
approval of the application for citizenship and because the arrests disclosed had occurred 
ten years prior to the defendant's petition. For a holding that false statements, knowingly 
made prior to the statutory period and before the date of the petition, are relevant to a 
determination of good character during the period required by law, see Stevens v. United 
States, (7th Cir. 1951) 190 F. (2d) 880. Under the present law, the court is not limited 
to a consideration of petitioner's conduct during the five years immediately preceding the 
filing of the petition but may consider conduct at any time prior to that period. 66 Stat. 
L. 243 (1952), 8 U.S.C. (1952) §1427 (e). 
8 United States v. Anastasio, (D.C. N.J. 1954) 120 F. Supp. 435. 
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Although Congress exercised the power given it by the Constitution4 
to establish a uniform, law of naturalization in 1790,5 it was not until 1906 
that there was a specific legislative provision for denaturalization. 6 In 
contrast to most European denaturalization statutes, which revoke citizen-
ship only because of acts occurring subsequent to naturalization,7 the 
American statute was based upon the theory that naturalized citizenship 
is void ab initio when obtained by fraud or illegality. Our statute de-
prives the naturalized citizen of the citizenship that was never rightfully 
his because he obtained it by fraud or because he failed to comply with 
the mandatory statutory provisions to perfect it. Thus, the American 
statute is not ex post facto when applied to naturalization proceedings 
initiated prior to its enactment.8 The present denaturalization action was 
part of the attorney general's drive to deport prominent criminals9 and 
was brought under the Naturalization Act of 1940.10 The majority in the 
principal case reached its decision by two steps: (1) that a denaturalization 
proceeding is essentially an action for rescission and, thus, the government 
must prove not only that the defendant was guilty of fraud, but also that 
it relied upon his fraudulent representation and was deceived thereby, 
and (2) that the government had constructive notice of the defendant's 
fraud because its examiner had knowledge of defendant's criminal record 
4 U.S. CONST., art. I, §8. 
5 1 Stat. L. 103 (1790). 
6 34 Stat. L. 596 (1906). As to prior methods of denaturalization, see Roche, "Pre-
statutory Denaturalization," 35 CORN. L. Q. 120 (1949). 
7 See the collection of foreign statutes in 44 CoL. L. R.Ev. 740, n. 14 (1944). 
s The statute under which the proceeding involved in the principal case was brought 
permitted cancellation of certificates of citizenship "on the ground of fraud or on the 
ground that such certificate of citizenship was illegally procured." 34 Stat. L. 601 (1906), 
re-enacted as 54 Stat. L. 1158 (1940), 8 U.S.C. (1946) §738. The Supreme Court, in up-
holding the statute's constitutionality, declaredt "The act imposes no punishment upon 
an alien who has previously procured a certificate of citizenship by fraud or other illegal 
conduct. It simply deprives him of his ill-gotten privileges .•. .'' Johannessen v. United 
States, 225 U.S. 227 at 242, 32 S.Ct. 613 (1912). For criticism of this view, see Justice 
Rutledge's concurring opinion in Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118 at 167, 
63 S.Ct. 1333 (1943), in which he says that this creates "two classes of citizens, one free 
and independent, one haltered with a lifetime string tied to its status.'' See also 50 CoL. 
L. R.Ev. 674 (1950). See, generally, Roche, "Statutory Denaturalization: 1906-1951," 13 
UNIV. Prrr. L. R.Ev. 276 (1952). 
9 For judicial recognition of this program, see Shaughnessy v. Accardi, 349 U.S. 280 
at 281, 75 S.Ct. 746 (1955). 
10 54 Stat. L. 1158 (1940), 8 U.S.C. (1946) §738. The denaturalization_ proceeding was 
instigated on December 10, 1952. The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 did not 
come into effect until December 24, 1952. One of the reasons for beginning the action 
prior to the effective date of this new statute might have been that it eliminated illegal 
procurement as a grounds for denaturalization and replaced fraud with "concealment 
of a material fact or by willful misrepresentations.'' 66 Stat. L. 260 (1952), 8 U.S.C. (1952) 
§1451 (a). For a holding that the government cannot maintain proceedings under the 
1952 act to cancel certificates illegally but not fraudulently procured prior to 1952, see 
United States v. Stromberg, 24 p.S. LAw WEEK 2237 (1955). 
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when defendant applied for naturalization. This is vulnerable to attack 
on both levels. The act under which the denaturalization proceeding was 
brought had two distinct and severable grounds for denaturalization, fraud 
and illegality.11 Assuming that there was no fraud established (which is 
highly doubtful12) the naturalization was nevertheless illegally procured 
because there was not complete adherence to the prescribed requirements 
of the statute.13 The Nationality Act of 1940 required that a certificate of 
arrival be attached to all petitions for naturalization,14 and since defend-
ant's certificate was based upon his fraudulent registry record (and there-
fore void) he failed to comply with the statute.15 Further, to use estoppeJ16 
to prevent the government from denaturalizing the defendant injects into 
denaturalization law a slippery concept the net effect of which is to defeat 
the legislative intent of preventing one who practices fraud from obtaining 
citizenship.17 Not only does this present a problem of separation of 
powers18 but estopping the government because of the negligence or error 
in judgment of a minor member of the executive branch could prevent the 
11 See note 8 supra. 
12 The defendant told the examiner, under oath, that he had not been absent from 
the country, whereas in his personal history statement filled out in conjunction with his 
application for citizenship he revealed that he had visited Canada frequently. Petition 
for rehearing, p. 6. 
13 In United States v. Ginsberg, 243 U.S. 472 at 475, 37 S.Ct. 422 (1917), the Court, 
in holding that there is no right to naturalization unless all statutory requirements are 
complied with, said that a certificate of citizenship was illegally procured because the 
judge gave the oath in his chambers instead of in open court as required by the act. In 
Schwinn v. United States, 311 U.S. 616, 61 S.Ct. 70 (1940), denaturalization was sustained 
because of the failure of a witness to meet the statutory qualifications even though the 
defects were unknown to the petitioner. 
14 Although defendant was naturalized under an amendment to the Nationality Act 
of 1940, which liberalized the requirements as to declaration of intention, period of resi-
dence, English language, etc., the necessity of attaching a certificate of arrival to the 
petition was not eliminated as one of the requirements. 56 Stat. L. 182 (1942), 8 U.S.C. 
(1942) §1001. 
15 "Filing the certificate of arrival being a matter of substance, it is clear that no 
power is vested in the naturalization court to dispense with it .•.• Naturalization granted 
without the certificate having been filed is, therefore, 'illegally procured'." United States 
v. Ness, 245 U.S. 319 at 324-325, 38 S.Ct. 118 (1917). See also Maney v. United States, 27S 
U.S. 17, 49 S.Ct. 15 (1928). 
16 The majority said that the examiner, being aware of defendant's criminal record, 
must have realized that defendant had fraudulently concealed it in his registry proceeding 
in 1931 or else he would not have been given a certificate of registry. But see United 
States v. Accardo, (D.C. N.J. 1953) 113 F. Supp. 783, affd. (3d Cir. 1953) 208 F. (2d) 632, 
cert. den. 347 U.S. 952, 74 S.Ct. 677 (1954), where the court refused to cllarge the govern-
ment with knowledge of the defendant's concealment of a conviction because it was known 
to the State Department, a separate branch of the Immigration office, and the United 
States Probation Office. 
17 The defendant did not reveal his fraud in obtaining the certificate of registry. 
18 See the dissenting opinion of Chief Judge Biggs in the denial of the petition for 
rehearing (principal case at 923) in which he states that it is difficult to see how an error 
of judgment committed by the executive branch can be imputed to the judicial branch. 
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government from correcting the errors of its many employees.19 The de-
cision in the principal case seems to reward deceit. It repudiates the doc-
trine that an alien seeking citizenship has a duty to make full disclosure.20 
Charles B. Renfrew, S.Ed. 
19 Even those who urge that the government should be bound by estoppel or con-
structive notice make a distinction between the case of a minor employee and the author-
ized administrative head who has the power to speak for the agency he represents. See, 
generally, Berger, "Estoppel against the Government," 21 UNIV. Cm. L. REv. 680 (1954). 
20 It is hard to see why the principle adopted by the court in United States v. 
Accardo, note 16 supra, that the alien seeking naturalization has the duty of making full 
disclosure in order that the government may investigate, is not applicable. 
